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Abstract 
This paper examines the link between publicly backed venture capital funds and business innovation 
in the UK venture capital market. In examining this relationship, the research empirically analyses 
the characteristics of 4,113 investment deals made to 2,359 UK based companies. We use patents as a 
proxy for innovation and find that obtaining investment solely from publicly backed VC funds, reduces 
the probability of the recipient company to apply for a patent compared with those companies that 
receive investments from private VC funds. In contrast, the probability of a company to have a patent 
or have applied for one does not vary significantly between companies that receive investments from 
both the public and the private sector and those companies that receive investments solely from 
private VC funds.  The results have implications for both policy makers and practitioners and stress 
the importance of co-investments between publicly backed and private venture capital funds to 
promote innovation.  
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1. Introduction  
A substantial amount of academic research has been put into the question of the impact of 
venture capital in the innovation performance of a company (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; 
Arqué-Castells, 2012; Popov and Roosenboom, 2012). A number of studies have shown that 
venture-backed firms are responsible for a disproportionate number of patents (which is used 
as a proxy for innovation) and new technologies, and bring more radical innovations to the 
market faster than lower growth businesses that rely on other types of finance (see, for 
example: Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann and Puri, 2000, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2010). 
In fact, research has shown that venture capital has played an important role in the 
development of some of the most significant scientific inventions and industries of our times 
(such as personal computers, cellular communications, microcomputer software, 
biotechnology, and overnight delivery) and high-growth venture-backed firms are also more 
likely to generate new industries (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Timmons and Spinelli, 
2003). 
Furthermore, the significant impact of venture capital on innovation has long been 
recognised by policy makers. Government schemes in support of the VC industry are 
intended to improve business innovation and growth, and close potential funding gaps, 
particularly for small high-technology start-ups (Sunley et al., 2005) or in particular regions 
(Mason and Harrison,2002). Such government-backed schemes
1
 aimed in leveraging private 
money (Sunley et al., 2005; Lerner, 2002), stimulating regional entrepreneurial activity 
(Mason and Harrison, 1999b) and generating R&D spill overs (Lerner, 2002).  To this end, 
governments around the world have taken a strong interest in facilitating access to finance for 
innovative high-growth companies and several schemes in support of the venture capital 
industry have been set up to overcome funding gaps (Sunley et al., 2005). The attempts to 
stimulate the supply of new sources of finance have followed different approaches, from 
ensuring that each region has access to regional-based VC funds to trying to demonstrate that 
investors in early stage funds can make robust returns, thereby promoting the private sector 
venture capital industry (Mason and Harrison, 2003).  
 
                                                          
1Public venture capital initiates are defined as ‘’programs that make equity or equity-like investments in young 
firms, or encourage other intermediaries to make such investments’’ (Lerner, 2002, p. 2). 
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 Successive UK Governments have introduced several schemes in support of venture 
capital finance including the, Early Growth Funds (EGFs), Regional Venture Capital Funds 
(RVCFs), University Challenge Seed Funds (UCSFs) and the Enterprise Capital Funds 
(ECFs). Various evaluations of the Government venture capital schemes have highlighted 
that UK publicly backed funds have had a negative financial performance and their overall 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) was substantial lower than the IRR reported by private funds 
(NAO 2009). Furthermore, such funds have had only a marginal impact on business 
performance (Nightingale et al., 2009). Buzzacchi et al. (2013) also found that higher public 
stakes are significantly correlated with a lower incidence of write-offs and a longer duration 
for their investments.  Nevertheless, public interventions have significantly increased the 
supply of finance for business seeking equity finance, and the public sector has become 
considerably more important as an investor in both absolute and relative terms (Mason and 
Pierrakis, 2013).  
Despite their increasing importance and attention by both academics and policy 
makers, little is still known about the impact of publicly backed venture capital funds on 
innovation. Some of the most informative studies are the ones by Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
and Brander et al. (2014). Kortum and Lerner (2000) measured the role of VC in innovation 
using patents as a proxy variable for business innovation while Brander et al. (2014) 
expanded the existing literature on the relationship between venture capital and patenting by 
including an additional parameter in this relationship, which is the source of venture capital 
(public or private).  In particular, the latter study provides strong evidence on the role of 
government VC in stimulating innovation. Additionally, it showed that enterprises with 
moderate government venture capital support outperform enterprises with only private 
venture capital support and those with extensive government venture capital support, both in 
terms of value creation and patent creation. Another study by Bertoni and Tykvová (2015) 
explored whether governmental venture capital investors (GVCs) spur invention and 
innovation in young biotech companies in Europe and found that GVCs, as stand along 
investors, have no impact on invention and innovation but boost the impact of independent 
venture capital investors (IVCs) when they invest together. Based on these theoretical 
premises, this research investigates the likely impact of the UK based publicly backed 
venture capital funds on business innovation.  
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In this paper we attempt to shed more light on the government backed venture capital 
funds (GVCs) and business innovation nexus by using a combination of commercial 
databases and publicly available information. This allows us to construct a unique database of 
4,113 individual investments and observe several characteristics of the VC backed companies 
such as amounts received, funding source, funding rounds and patent grants or applications. 
Importantly, we are able to distinguish between private and government backed venture 
capital investments and capture potential industrial and geographical differences. Hence, our 
work goes beyond the existing literature by analysing the relation between government 
backed venture capital investments and innovation using a much larger sample of UK based 
companies
2
, focusing on the regional heterogeneity of the UK market. In this way, it reveals 
new characteristics of the venture capital communities in the UK and contributes to the 
debate about the potential impact of VC in economic development and innovation proxied by 
patents.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a background of 
the study and derives the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4 the empirical 
findings are discussed. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks and further research 
directions.  
 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Patents and venture capital 
A large body of literature suggests that venture capital plays a central role in the emergence 
of new industries by funding and supporting innovative companies which later dominate 
these industries. Indeed, Lerner and Watson (2008) argue that the venture capital model is 
more effective in commercialising scientific discoveries than the corporate sector, despite the 
latter’s large expenditure on R&D. Venture capital investment speeds the development of 
companies, enabling them to transform ideas quickly into marketable products and become 
industry leaders through first mover advantages (Zhang, 2007). Against this interpretation of 
the results found in the literature cited above is the work of Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) which 
argued that this is one-sided interpretation and there may be an opposite causality: arrivals of 
                                                          
2
Brander et al. (2010) used the number of investments made to 60 UK publicly backed companies while this 
research uses a much larger sample of 1,467 publicly backed investments.  
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significant innovation opportunities stimulate new firm start-ups to exploit such opportunities 
and these start-ups demand VC because venture capitalists are complements to such firms 
that VC spurs growth and innovation of new firms.  
In fact, there are two distinctive streams of literature dealing with the relationships 
between venture capital and patents, namely on the role of patents as driver of VC 
investments (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Kaplan et al., 2009; Haeussler et al., 2009; Hirukawa 
and Ueda, 2011) and on the impact of VC investments in stimulating patent creation (Kortum 
and Lerner, 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Lerner and Watson, 2008). Our paper 
contributes to the latter body of literature by examining the role of publicly backed venture 
capital investments in patent creation.  
Looking at the relationship between venture capital and the number of patents, a 
variety of studies suggest that venture-backed firms are responsible for a disproportionate 
number of patents and new technologies (Kortum and Lerner 2000), and they seem to bring 
more radical innovations to market faster than lower growth businesses that rely on other 
types of finance (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  More particularly, Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
examined the influence of venture capital on patented inventions in the United States across 
twenty industries over three decades. They found that increases in venture capital activity in 
an industry are associated with significantly higher patenting rates. While the ratio of venture 
capital to R&D averaged less than 3 percent from 1983-92, they estimated that venture 
capital may have accounted for 8 percent of industrial innovations in that period. The strong 
relationship between venture capital and patenting on an industry level is also indicative of a 
relationship between venture disbursements and innovative output.  
 
Mann and Sager (2007) have analysed the relation between the patenting behaviour of 
start-up firms and the progress of those firms through the venture capital cycle. Linking the 
data relating to venture capital financing of software start-up firms with data concerning the 
patents obtained by those firms, they found a significant and robust positive correlation 
between patenting practices and several variables measuring the firm’s performance 
(including number of rounds, total investment, exit status, receipt of late stage financing and 
longevity).  
Moreover, Hellmann and Puri (2000) find a strong association between patents and 
VC funding. Therefore, the basic theoretical premise of this paper is that there is a strong 
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relationship between venture capital and patent creation. Building on this premise, we 
hypothesise that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Follow up venture capital investments are positively associated with patents.  
 
2.2 Public and private VC funds 
It is often argued that the value added by experienced venture capital rests not only in its 
‘hard’ financing aspects but also in ‘soft’ advice and knowledge roles (Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2001; Pinch and Sunley, 2009; Hall and Lerner, 2010; Luukkonen et al., 2013). 
Knowledge regarding the target company’s industry allows the venture capitalist to oversee 
investments more efficiently and more effectively, in part because industry experience 
enhances the venture capitalist’s ability to recognize signs of trouble at an early stage 
(Sonerson and Stuart, 2001). Venture capitalists provide several critical services in addition 
to providing money such as helping the company to raise more money, reviewing and helping 
to formulate business strategy, filling in the management team, and introducing the company 
to potential customers and suppliers (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989).  
The competence of the venture capitalist investment managers arises from active 
business involvement in the respective industry. It cannot be acquired in short order, nor is it 
easily transferable (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004). Gompers and Lerner (1999, p. 4) 
note that: ‘‘Not only is it difficult to raise a new venture capital fund without a track record, 
but the skills needed for successful venture capital investing are difficult and time-consuming 
to acquire”. This has direct implications to the creation and management of the government 
backed funds. Despite their commitment to act as commercial funds, various scholar (Mason 
and Harrison, 2003; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004; Shäfer and Shilder, 2009) found to 
be a lack of venture-capital skills to enable effective fund management. Knockaert et al. 
(2006) find that investment managers of government backed funds are less involved in value-
adding activities than other investors, while Luukkonen et al. (2013) argue that the 
contributions of private VC funds are significantly higher than those of GVC funds in a 
number of areas, including the development of the business idea, professionalisation and exit 
orientation. In the same way Shäfer and Shilder (2009) using German data suggest that public 
sector venture capital funds may not be as ‘smart’ as private sector venture capital in terms of 
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adding value.  The capabilities of public sector fund managers are therefore often questioned, 
both in terms of their ability to make good investments (quality of deal flow, domain 
knowledge, effectiveness of their due diligence) and to add value to their investee companies 
(e.g. mentoring skills, strategic insights, networks) (see NESTA, 2009). According to Munary 
and Toschi (2009), even if the public intervention was target to companies with a real need 
for governmental sustain, this financial support could be inefficiently managed by local VCs 
due to their lack of experience and skills.  
Unlike Private VC investors (PVCs) who are generally interested in maximising their 
capital gains by increasing the market value of their new venture investees, GVC investors 
have much broader objectives. A patent adds value to the company and therefore we 
hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: PVCs have a stronger impact on patent creation than GPVs. 
 
We further argue that publicly backed VCs and private VCs are complements in their 
contribution to innovation. To pursue innovation activities including patenting, companies 
need to have a long-term strategy towards innovation and access to a rich set of resources and 
added value capabilities. Similarly to Bertoni and Tykvová (2015), we argue that this is the 
case when a company is invested by both a publicly backed VC fund and a private VC fund. 
Publicly backed and private funds have access to different networks of contacts, have 
different skills and experience and support differently their portfolio companies (Luukkonen 
et al., 2013). On one hand, publicly backed funds have a wider outreach and are better 
connected with the regional innovation players such as university labs, university incubators 
and science parks than the private venture capital funds. On the other hand, private VC funds 
have access to more financial resources and add more value to the portfolio companies 
(Shäfer and Shilder, 2009; Luukkonen et al., 2013). Accordingly, we expect to observe more 
patenting activity in companies where publicly backed VCs and private VCs co-invest than in 
companies with only one investor type. 
 
Hypothesis 3: GVC funds are more likely to invest in companies with patents when they co-
invest together with PVC funds. 
 
Finally, there are two important aspects of VC activity that need to be distinguished, 
selection and nurturing, or the ability of the investment managers to select good ventures and 
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the ability of the managers to nurture these ventures (see Baumand Silverman, 2004). Based 
on the lack of appropriate skills identified in the literature, it is believed that venture 
capitalists from the public sector will not be able to provide post-investment support of 
similar quality to the support provided by their private counterparts. Therefore, while they 
may be able to select good opportunities, perhaps due to their wide network of contacts in 
regional Universities, incubators and science parks, they may be less capable of nurturing 
their portfolio companies. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: PVC funded companies will have greater pre-investment (before any VC 
funding) innovation capabilities (patents) as compared to companies funded solely by GVC 
funds. 
 
Once invested, GVC investors may often pursue broader strategic objectives for their 
new venture investments (rather than getting patents and consequently gaining value). PVC 
investors are also better skilled than GVC investors (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004). 
Therefore the final hypothesis of this paper argues that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: PVC funded companies will exhibit greater post-investment (after 1
st
 
investment is made) rates of innovation as compared to companies funded solely by GVC 
funds. 
 
3. Data and research methodology 
3.1 Data collection strategy 
In order to probe beyond the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) aggregate figures, 
the Library House data (now absorbed into Dow Jones Venture Source) has been utilised in 
this paper. The Library House database reports individual investments along with various 
additional information on the investor and business which enabled customised tables to be 
generated. This includes: deal size (in British Pounds), number of funding round, industry 
operation and region where the fund recipient company is based.  The availability of such 
information on individual deals allows considerable flexibility in analysis. Using Library 
House database, a dataset of 4,113 individual investments to 2,359 UK based companies 
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spread to all UK regions for the period 2000-2008 was created. The period covered in the 
analysis, 2000-2008 was determined by data availability during the data collection period. 
The information provided by Library House and extensive desk research has allowed for the 
classification of investments into the following categories (for description of the variables see 
Table A1 in appendix):  
(i) PVCs: Deals involving one or more private sector investors. This category captures solely 
deals made by private funds and without the involvement of one or more publicly backed 
venture capital firms. 
(ii) GVCs:  Deals involving one or more publicly backed funds (for example, RVCFs). 
Government backed funds are funds that have received some or all of their capital from the 
public sector, including regional development agencies, the European Union, devolved 
administrations or government schemes. They are normally managed by independent fund 
managers. The dataset does not allow us to differentiate between publicly backed funds and 
those solely supported and run by the public sector. As an example, investments made by the 
Scottish Co-Investment Fund, Scottish Seed Fund, Scottish Venture Fund, and Business 
Growth Fund are not separately identified but simply classified as ‘Scottish Enterprise’ in the 
dataset. The data from all these publicly backed funds are aggregated in order to conduct the 
analysis using a sufficient number of cases. While separate programmes, their similarities in 
terms of stage of investment financed, fund structures used and sought outcomes are 
sufficiently common to allow such an aggregation (for an analysis see Nightingale et al., 
2011).  
(iii) GVCs and PVCs Co-investments: Deals – which are termed here co-investments – in 
which one or more private sector investors has invested alongside one or more public sector 
funds. Investments in this category include both ad-hoc syndications between public sector 
funds and private investors and also investments involving Co-Investment Funds that have 
been established specifically to invest alongside private investors. 
 
3.1.1 Patents as a proxy of innovation 
Patents, number of applications or grants, and business R&D expenditure have been widely 
used by scholars as proxies of innovation (see Mann and Sager, 2007; Ueda and Hirukawa, 
2006). Both proxies are widely available at industry or country level and partially available at 
the regional level. However, we recognise that both of these measurements of innovations 
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have important limitations. According to Frenz and Oughton (2005), there are three main 
weaknesses of patent data. Firstly, patents do not capture innovation by firms that are 
Schumpeterian imitators, that is, firms that introduce products or processes that are new to 
their firm but not new to the market or industry.  Secondly, not all innovations that are new to 
the market are patented. Thirdly, the propensity to patent may vary significantly across 
industries and sectors, for example, between manufacturing and services. Moreover, patents 
are often registered at the Head Office of an enterprise, thus there are regional distortions that 
arise as a result of administrative features of the patent system (Smith, 2005). In addition, 
patents are not always introduced on the market and their economic value can be questionable 
(Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).  Verdolini and Galeotti (2009) argue that patent data cannot provide 
any insight on, what they call, disembodied technological change, such as for example the 
learning process by which individuals can increase the productivity of the production process 
thanks to “learning by doing”, is clearly left out of a study based on patent data.  
Keeping in mind the limitations outlined above, and the absence of a more suitable 
and easily identifiable measurement for innovation for the purpose of this research, the use of 
patent data with the purpose of investigating the relationship between VC and innovation has 
several advantages and as Grilliges puts it: “after all, patent does represent a minimal 
quantum of invention that has passed both the scrutiny of the patent office as to its novelty 
and the test of the investment of effort and resources by the inventor and his organization into 
the development of this product or idea, indicating thereby the presence of a non-negligible 
expectation as to its ultimate utility and marketability” (Grilliches, 1998, p.296). A patent 
application may suggest that the business has the potential to get a patent.  In addition, a 
patent application is the preferred proxy for our research, since there might be a significant 
time lag between filing an application and receiving a grant (Hall et al. 2001) and the 
application date is more indicative of when the knowledge is created (Chung and Yeaple, 
2008). 
Using the EPO online search facility which is integrated in the UK Patents Office 
website, it was possible to identify individual companies that have been granted or have 
applied for an EPO patent. Matching the Library House database with the EPO database, it 
was possible to check which of the 2,359 companies that received one or more of the 4,113 
individual VC investments had received or applied for a patent at the time of the investment. 
As an example, a company from our dataset had 2 patents when it received its first 
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investment, 6 patents when it received its second investment, 9 when it received its third 
investment and 10 when it received its fourth round of investment.  
 
3.2 Sample characteristics 
The investments are presented by source of finance and are broken down into four categories: 
All investments, Government VC investments (GVCs), Private VC investments (PVCs) and 
GVCs & PVCs co-investments (see Table 1). Data on the size (amounts) of the individual 
investments were not always available. In Table 2 we present correlations between industry 
sectors and number of patents, investment deals, size of investment deals and financing 
rounds.  
As shown in Table 2 several industries are closely correlated with patents. For 
instance, the correlation coefficient of 0.22 between ICT and patents and 0.22 between  
Pharmaceutical & Biotechnology  and patents, implies that VC backed companies  that 
operate in these two sectors  are more likely to seek  patent protection compared with other 
sectors. In contrast, companies operating in Software & Computer Services, Consumer & 
Business and Media are less likely to have a patent.  The stage of investment (number of 
round) is also positively correlated with patent (0.23) reflecting the relationship between 
patent and later stage deals as examined earlier. Interestingly, investments made by GVCs are 
negatively correlated with patents and this relationship will be examined further in the next 
sections. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
All deals 
  
GVCs 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 4113 2004 2.432 2000 2008 
 
Year 652 2005 2.174 2000 2008 
Amounts* 3173 1.331 1.097 0.063 7.745 
 
Amounts* 473 0.491 0.291 0.063 2.746 
Rounds 4113 1.85 1.206 1 10 
 
Rounds 652 1.466 0.877 1 7 
Patents 4113 4.01 13.189 0 319 
 
Patents 652 1.628 6.376 0 98 
 
PVCs 
  
GVCs & PVCs Co-investments 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 2645 2004 2.525 2000 2008 
 
Year 816 2005 1.948 2000 2008 
Amounts* 2075 1.658 1.186 0.071 7.745 
 
Amounts* 625 0.882 0.545 0.071 4.647 
Rounds 2645 1.926 1.239 1 10 
 
Rounds 816 1.919 1.263 1 9 
Patents 2645 4.851 15.587 0 319 
 
Patents 816 3.213 7.013 0 51 
* Square root of the amount of each deal divided by 1000        
* 
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Table 2: Correlations between deal characteristics and industry 
 
 Variables Patents PVCs  
GVCs & 
PVCs Co-
investments GVCs 
Size of 
deal 
Number 
of round 
Patents 1      
PVCs  0.01 1     
GVCs & PVCs Co-
investments 0.06 -0.64 1    
GVCs -0.13 -0.56 -0.21 1   
Size of deal 0.07 0.29 -0.17 -0.20 1  
Number of round 0.23 0.05 0.03 -0.14 0.12 1 
Consumer & Business -0.19 -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 
Energy 0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Finance -0.07 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.15 -0.06 
Healthcare 0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.02 
ICT 0.22 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.15 
Leisure Goods -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.03 
Manufacturing & 
Industrial 0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.04 
Media -0.12 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 0.22 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.08 
Software & Computer 
Services -0.21 0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
Notes: * Correlation coefficients that are statistically significant at 10% level are in bold. 
 
A venture capital backed company normally receives several rounds of finance called 
funding rounds.  Each time a company needs new finance (for example in order to launch a 
new product, to conduct new trails etc.) it raises a new round (see Gompers, 1995). This 
happens until the company is ready to exit through an IPO or a Merger or Acquisition. Some 
companies need only few rounds before exit while others need several. Companies that are 
not able to raise further funding rounds are normally acquired or cease operations. A venture 
capital fund may take part in one or several funding rounds. Because the structure of venture 
capital financing gives venture capitalists a realistic opportunity to terminate firms after each 
round, and makes each additional round a substantial indicator of progress, the number of 
rounds is also a good proxy for performance (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Mann and Sager, 
2007). Table 3 presents the association between VC backed companies and patents or patent 
applications at each funding round. We also test whether or not there is a difference between 
the means and the results are reported in Table A2 in appendix. 
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Table 3: VC investment made to companies 
 
  All deals PVCs GVCs 
GVCs & PVCs 
Co-invest. deals 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Variable Obs. 
Patents 
Mean 
(dummy) 
Obs. 
Patents  
Mean 
(dummy) 
Obs. 
Patents  
Mean 
(dummy) 
Obs. 
Patents  
Mean 
(dummy) 
Funding round 1 2184 0.12 1319 0.12 451 0.08 414 0.16 
Funding round 2 1035 0.25 687 0.25 137 0.15 211 0.3 
Funding round 3 498 0.4 357 0.41 39 0.26 102 0.43 
Funding round 4 228 0.43 165 0.46 13 0.31 50 0.38 
Funding round 5 107 0.42 79 0.46 6 0.33 22 0.32 
Funding round 6 34 0.44 20 0.45 5 0.25 11 0.5 
Funding round 7 15 0.47 12 0.64 1 0 3 0 
Funding round 8 9 0.56 6 0.67     3 0.33 
Total 4113   2645   652   816   
Notes: Column (1) of Table 3 includes funding rounds from one to ten. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) include the number of 
investments by round, while columns (3), (5), (7) and (9) shows the proportion of investments that were made to companies 
that had applied for a patent at the time of investment. 
 
Around 12 percent of all first round investments (GVCs or PVCs) are found to be 
associated with a patent or patent application. From the 1,035 investments in round 2, one 
quarter (25 percent) are associated with one or more patent applications at the time of 
investment. In later funding rounds the proportion of investments associated with patents 
exceeds 40 percent. It is clear that the percentage of investments that is associated with 
patents rises as the funding of the company progresses to later rounds. As a result hypothesis 
1 is supported suggesting that follow up venture capital investments are positively associated 
with patents. However, we recognise that this finding is open to criticism: For example it can 
be argued that companies are more likely to progress to the next level of funding if they have 
a patent or companies acquire patents during their investments journey.  This issue will be 
further explored later in the paper.  
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that patents granted or patent applications are stronger 
related to PVCs than GVCs. Specifically, 12 percent of all first round PVC investments, 8 
percent of GVC investments and 16 percent of GVC & PVC co-investments are made to 
companies that undertake patent protection. As the investment journey progresses, the 
proportion of GVC backed companies with patent applications increases but to a lower rate 
compared with PVC backed companies. This provides some preliminary evidence to support 
hypothesis 2 of this research. 
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4. Empirical findings 
Turning to our empirical specification, a negative binominal probit model (see Cameron and  
Trivedi, 1998) is used to examine the relationship between the type of venture capital 
investment (GVC, PVC or co-investment between the two) and the innovation outputs of the 
firm (proxied by patent applications).  In this case the dependent variable indicates the 
number of patent applications of the company at each funding round. Negative binomial 
regression is preferred for (nonnegative) over-dispersed count outcome variables (i.e. a 
likelihood ratio test comparing this model to a Poisson model was estimated suggesting that 
the negative binomial model is more appropriate than the Poisson model). However, we also 
estimate ordered probit and poisson regression models as a reference and robustness check, 
but the results are similar and thus are not discussed here for reasons of brevity. 
Since individual firm operates in a sector, which might have similar characteristics, 
we consider sector heterogeneity in the specification to allow for a degree of dependency 
within sectors. Regional dummies are also included in the model to take into account regional 
variations. Finally, we incorporate clustering to allow the analysis to deal with potential 
unobserved individual effects as well as the extent of the inconsistency in the random 
estimates when the individual effect and some of the regressors are correlated (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Kimmel, 2005). 
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Table 4: Modelling the number of patents creation using a negative binomial model
1 
 
  
Delta-
method 
 
Delta-
method 
 
Delta-
method 
 
Delta-
method 
 
Delta-
method 
  dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Public investment -0.469*** 0.065 -0.300*** 0.063 -0.200*** 0.057 -0.147** 0.071 -0.115** 0.045 
Co-investment -0.038 0.048 -0.109** 0.048 -0.062 0.043 -0.016 0.052 -0.038 0.036 
Number of 
investors - - 0.13*** 0.014 0.097*** 0.013 0.082*** 0.017 0.023** 0.012 
Number of round - - - - 0.155*** 0.014 0.143*** 0.016 0.065*** 0.012 
Deal size  - - - - - - 0.072*** 0.020 0.062*** 0.016 
           Industry dummies - - - - - - - - YES 
Regional 
dummies - - - - - - - - YES 
Year dummies - - - - - - - - YES 
           Log-Likelihood -3,546.175 -3,496.306 -3,414.550 -2,748.704 -2,374.548 
LR test of α=0 chi2(1)=   1535.470*** chi2(1)=   1357.930*** chi2(1)=   1119.390*** chi2(1)=    878.960*** chi2(1)=   427.760*** 
BIC -27,102.370 -27,128.547 -27,283.739 -19,937.667 -18,406.834 
           Observations 4,113 4,106 4,106 3,163 2,936 
Notes: 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        Standard errors adjusted for cluster effects. 
       1Ordered probit and poisson regression models provide similar information. 
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In Table 4 we present the results from the estimations (marginal effects). Overall, the 
results in Table 4 suggest that GVCs standalone investments are strongly and negatively 
associated with the number of patent applications. Specifically, after controlling for other 
variables, on average public investments have 0.115 fewer patents than private investments.  
In addition, obtaining GVCs & PVCs Co-investments is not associated with an increase or a 
decrease in the likelihood of the company to patent an idea compared with those that receive 
investment from PVCs funds. Hence hypothesis 2 is supported while hypothesis 3 is not. In 
other words, companies that receive investments from private venture capital funds are more 
likely to apply for more patents compared with those companies that receive investments 
from government backed venture capital funds only. 
In order to control for the selection or nurturing effect, all the investments have been 
partitioned into first round investments (2184 in total). By checking the date the company had 
applied for a patent, we were able to identify that 264 companies had a patent at the time of 
the 1
st
 round of investment, leaving 1920 companies without patent at the time. We then 
examine whether any of these 1920 companies applied for a patent after the 1
st
 investment 
and we find that 310 of them applied. This sample allows us to observe whether the company 
had applied for a patent at the time of its first investment, and whether the company applied 
for a patent after the first investment was made. We use three distinctive models for this 
analysis: Bivariate Probit (columns 1 and 2), Multivariate Probit (columns 3 and 4) and 
finally Probit with Sample Selection (Heckman Probit), (columns 5 and 6). The first two 
models permit the two dependent variables to depend on the same list of independent 
variables allowing for a correlation between the error terms of the two equations (see 
Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003; Greene, 2003). Indeed the coefficient of correlation between 
the two error terms (ρ) is found to be statistically different from zero. The last model assumes 
that we observe whether the company applied for a patent after the first investment only if the 
firm had applied for a patent at the first time of its investment (see Heckman, 1979). 
However, the LR test does not reject independence of the two errors terms suggesting that 
selection bias is not a problem for the model estimated. 
The coefficients of these models are presented in Table 5. Columns (1), (3) and (5) 
examine whether the company had applied for a patent at the time it received its first 
investment. Table 5 shows a negative coefficient for GVCs but not statistically significant in 
all three models. Similarly, columns (2), (4) and (6) examine whether there was an increase in 
the number of patent applications of the company since it received its first investment. The 
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coefficients for GVCs are negative but this time statistically significant in all three models. 
The results of the analyses in Table 5 suggest that the professionals from the publicly backed 
funds are equally capable in identifying and investing in companies with patent potential as 
the professionals from the private funds, but less capable in supporting companies in 
acquiring new patents, once the investments has been made, when they invest alone. 
Therefore hypothesis 4 is rejected while hypothesis 5 is confirmed. This suggests that 
the problem may not be the inability of GVC fund managers to select innovative companies 
but their limited capacity to nurture and assist their portfolio companies in applying and 
consequently receiving patents.  
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Table 5: Pre-funding and post-funding innovation capabilities for new ventures 
 
Model: Bivariate probit Multivariate probit Probit with sample selection
1
 
Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Had a patent 
when received 
its 1st 
investment 
There was an 
increase in patents 
since 1st 
investment 
Had a patent 
when received 
its 1st 
investment 
There was an 
increase in patents 
since 1st 
investment 
Had a patent when 
received its 1st 
investment 
(selection) 
There was an increase 
in patents since 1st 
investment (outcome) 
GVCs -0.079 0.140 -0.254** 0.125 -0.090 0.139 -0.286** 0.126 -0.066 0.147 -1.228*** 0.442 
GVCs & PVCs Coinv. 0.077 0.161 0.236 0.148 0.078 0.160 0.282* 0.151 -0.108 0.173 0.676 0.487 
Number of investors 0.127** 0.052 0.163*** 0.046 0.123** 0.051 0.148*** 0.046 0.124** 0.053 -0.088 0.175 
Deal size 0.086 0.057 -0.017 0.051 0.093* 0.055 -0.011 0.053 0.071 0.058 0.287 0.210 
             
             Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             Log-Likelihood -1,017.585 -1,037.193 -482.975 
Wald/LR test of ρ=0 chi2(1) =  143.272***  chi2(1) =  121.895***  chi2(1) =   0.120  
Observations 1446 1446 1446                                                                                                
(1261 censored obs and 185 censored obs)                   
Notes: 
        
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
    
1
The selection equation includes a proxy of the "quality of the patent" at the 1st investment,  
     Standard errors adjusted for cluster effects. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the impact of publicly backed venture capital funds in business 
innovation. In absence of other data (e.g. patent citations or proprietary company-level data 
on new product innovations/prototype development), we use patent applications as a proxy 
for innovation. We find that the statistically significant and negative coefficient observed 
between GVC backed investments and the firm’s potential to innovate remains strong, even 
after controlling for a variety of factors associated with sectoral structures or investments 
characteristics: differences between regions, industry focus, investments size or investments 
stage. This suggests that this relationship is the result of some unmeasured investment 
characteristics or the environment in which funds operate. Such an unmeasured investment 
characteristic could be the chosen investment strategy of the GVCs funds. GVCs funds could 
have as part of their objectives to fill the gap associated with private funds giving priority to 
ventures engaged in patenting and tending to discount or even ignore ventures without patent 
activity. In this case public backed funds intentions might be in part to explicitly fill a gap 
that exists because private funds require (or give strong preference) to ventures engaged in 
patenting and ignore or underfund firms that have yet to patent or apply for a patent.  Under 
this scenario, we would expect that GVCs funds would tend to be more interested in “pre or 
non-patenting” firms than private firms and would tend to pull out of investments when 
patent applications are made, leaving those investments to the private venture capital funds. 
In this case, the empirical results of this research may be an outcome of the ex-ante policy 
choices made by publicly backed fund managers (e.g. to invest in very early stage companies 
which are neglected by private funds). However, our analysis also shows that when selecting 
companies for a first round investment, patents are equally important (or unimportant) to both 
GVCs and PVCs. 
Another explanation of the results is that venture capitalists from the publicly backed 
funds included in our sample may not have the skills required for nurturing high growth 
ventures. While they were able to identify companies with innovation potential, perhaps due 
to their extended network of contacts with the regional innovation ecosystem (including 
universities and science parks) they were less capable of nurturing these companies after they 
included them in their fund portfolio. 
Our analysis has few limitations that we acknowledge. First, our paper does not deal 
with the causality, which is due to data limitations, and we observe an association only 
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between patent application and source of funding. Second, the quality of the patents has not 
been accessed. Patents backed by publicly backed funds may be of better quality of those 
backed by private funds or the opposite. Lerner et al. (2008) research on patent quality (using 
number of citations as a proxy for economic importance) found that patents applied by firms 
in private equity transactions are more cited, and such research could be undertaken within 
the framework of a follow up study.  Third, patents have been used as a proxy for innovation. 
Although the literature accepts that patent creation is an important measurement for 
innovation, additional proxies for innovation could be used in future analysis such as 
licenses, trademarks, number of new products in the market, copyrights etc. One may argue, 
for example, that patents have more to do with intellectual property protection of innovations 
and not necessarily capture innovation itself. Forth, additional dependent variables could be 
used in future analysis such as the performance of the VC backed companies and its 
association with patent and public or private investment. In this sense, performance could be 
defined as company turnover, employment growth etc. Fifth, our dataset does not include 
information on exited firms and therefore we were not able to test the potential influence of 
survivorship bias. Finally, a further research could control for other characteristics of the firm 
that may affect its innovation outputs, such as size of firm, foreign ownership, export activity, 
openness, structure and R&D activity among others. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Description of variables 
 
Variable Description Source 
Patents 
 
The number of patent application at the time of investment 
(categorical variable) 
 
EPO 
Had a patent when 
received its 1st 
investment 
 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the company had applied for one, 
and 0 otherwise 
 
EPO 
There was an increase in 
patents since 1st 
investment 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the company applied for one or 
more patents, and 0 otherwise 
 
EPO 
PVCs 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the deal is made solely by one or 
more private funds 
Library 
House, desk 
research 
GVCs 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the deal is made solely by one or 
more publicly backed funds 
Library 
House, desk 
research 
GVCs + PVCs Co-
investments 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the deal is a syndicate between a 
publicly backed fund and a private fund 
Library 
House, desk 
research 
Deal size A measurement of the size of the deal in square root Library House 
Number of round 
An ordinal variable indicating the number of funding round when 
the deal took place (1-8) 
Library House 
Regional dummies 
Dummies that take the value 1 if the company that received the 
investment is located in a particular region and 0 otherwise 
Library House 
Industry dummies 
Dummies that take the value 1 if the company that received the 
investment operates in a particular region, and 0 otherwise 
Library House 
Year dummies 
Dummies that take the value if the investment took place in a 
particular year and 0 otherwise 
Library House 
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Table A2:  Mean difference test results for Table 3 
PVCs- GVCs & PVCs Co-investments PVCs - GVCs 
GVCs - GVCs & PVCs Co-
investments 
Obs Diff t-value Obs Diff t-value Obs Diff t-value 
1733 -0.035 -1.843* 1770 0.038 2.195** 865 -0.073 -3.317*** 
898 -0.048 -1.396 824 0.109 2.743*** 348 -0.157 -3.396*** 
459 -0.023 0.404 396 0.152 1.854* 141 -0.175 -1.923* 
216 0.0838 1.043 179 0.156 1.086 63 -0.723 -0.475 
102 0.144 1.207 86 0.129 0.607 28 0.0151 0.067 
30 -0.05 -0.25 24 0.2 0.717 14 -0.25 -0.812 
14 0.636 2.121* 12 0.63 
 
4 
  9 0.333 0.882 
 
     3466 -0.054 -2.823*** 3291 0.148 7.215*** 1467 -0.203 -8.392*** 
 
 
 
